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“Consequently, I viewed the principle of independence as incompatible
with the preference for security in the neighborhood of certainty shown by
every subject... This led me to devise some counter-examples. One of them,
formulated in 1952, has become famous as the ‘Allais Paradox.’ Today,
it is as widespread as its real meaning is generally misunderstood.” —
Maurice Allais
I. INTRODUCTION
Experimental evidence has shown that individuals reliably violate the independence
axiom, the central tenet of expected utility theory.1 In 1952, Maurice Allais proposed
one of the earliest, and still to-date most famous, counter-examples, now known as
the “Allais Paradox.” For concreteness, consider the common ratio version of the
Allais Paradox introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Ask a decision maker
the following two binary questions:
Option A: Option B:
Q1: 100% chance of $3000 vs. 80% chance of $4000
20% chance of $0
Q2: 25% chance of $3000 vs. 20% chance of $4000
75% chance of $0 80% chance of $0
Many individuals choose Option A in the first decision and choose Option B in the
second.2 This pattern of choices violates the independence axiom.3
Allais attributed these violations to a preference for security, quoted above, now
referred to as the “certainty effect” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and
Tversky describe the certainty effect as the phenomenon in which “people overweight
outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely proba-
ble” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 265). The intuition in the Allais Paradox is
that the preference of Option A over Option B in Q1 is driven, in part, by the fact that
Option A offers a sure payoff. When both options are risky, as in Q2, neither offers
1Independence states that for any three lotteries p, q, and r, and any number λ in [0,1], if p is
preferred to q, then λp+(1−λ)r is preferred to λq+(1−λ)r. That is, mixing both lotteries p and q with
a common lottery r, and in common proportions, should not change the relative preference between p
and q.
2Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that 80% of individuals preferred Option A in Question 1,
while 65% preferred Option B in Question 2. Over half of their subjects violated independence.
3To see this, let λ= 0.25 and r be 100% chance of $0.
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the appeal of certainty, so preferences can reverse. Allais’s original intuition, shared
by many and confirmed by experimental evidence, has led to large theoretical and
experimental literatures in search of a descriptive non-expected utility model. We
review these papers in Section II. The certainty effect also has been invoked to ex-
plain behaviors outside the domain of simple lotteries, such as present bias (Halevy,
2008) and aversion to gradual pieces of information (Dillenberger, 2010).
Given the prominence of the Allais Paradox and robust evidence of the certainty
effect, a persistent thread in the literature is that the certainty effect drives viola-
tions of independence. For example, Schmidt (1998) says that “the bulk of observed
violations of the independence axiom is due to the certainty effect.” Under this view,
the claim is that most violations of independence occur when an individual prefers a
sure amount to a risky lottery. A few papers have found significant violations of inde-
pendence when the risky lottery is preferred to the sure amount before mixing—the
opposite pattern, or “reverse certainty effect”—but there has been no systematic test
of the independence axiom and the certainty effect.
The goal of our paper is to provide such a test. We fix a probability simplex, which,
in our experiment, is the set of possible lotteries over {$10, $20, $30}. We pick forty-
five lotteries uniformly across this simplex. Subjects face binary choices between $20
for sure and a randomly-selected subset of these uniformly-distributed risky lotter-
ies. Given the wide range of lotteries we sample, subjects will prefer $20 to the risky
lottery in some questions, while in other questions they will prefer the risky lottery
to $20. We then mix the alternatives according to three different probabilities to see
if preferences reverse, constituting a violation of independence. This allows us to
detect and compare independence violations when certainty is preferred to risk (i.e.
when individuals prefer $20 for sure to the risky lottery, but then reverse preferences
once both are mixed), consistent with the certainty effect, to those when risk is pre-
ferred to certainty (i.e. when individuals prefer the risky lottery to $20 for sure, but
then reverse preferences when both are mixed), consistent with the reverse certainty
effect.
We find that reverse certainty effect violations are far more common than certainty
effect violations. Conditional on preferring certainty to risk, individuals violate inde-
pendence 15% of the time. In stark contrast, individuals violate independence almost
40% of the time conditional on preferring risk to certainty. Results hold on an indi-
vidual level, as well. The modal subject never violates independence in questions
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where they prefer certainty to a risky lottery, while the modal subject violates inde-
pendence in one-third of questions where they prefer the risky lottery over certainty.
Our design also allows us to look at a more rigorous test of the independence axiom,
comparing choices across all four mixing probabilities. This analysis confirms our
main results, with most violations coming from instances where individuals choose
the risky lottery over certainty and then switch to choosing the safer lottery as the
alternatives are mixed.
We test the robustness of these results along two dimensions. First, we move
slightly away from certainty by comparing with a lottery which gives $20 with 90%
chance (otherwise a 5% chance of $30 and a 5% chance of $10) rather than $20 with
certainty. Second, we vary the “mixing lottery” from one in the spirit of the Allais
Paradox to one less commonly studied. Overall, our results are robust to these per-
turbations.
Our results contribute to a large experimental literature testing the independence
axiom. Ours is the first large-scale systematic test around certainty, giving general
evidence on the frequency and location of independence violations. We believe our
results will be particularly useful to incorporate into theoretical models of choice
under risk. Recent theories seek to characterize and axiomatize the certainty effect
in building descriptive models of choice. Our results suggest that these theories may
miss an important pattern of behavior. In our data, we could explain significantly
more choices by modeling the exact opposite preference.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Since Allais’s objections to the descriptive validity of the Expected Utility Theory
(EUT), an enormous amount of theoretical effort has been devoted to developing al-
ternatives to EUT. Hand-in-hand with theoretical advancements is an experimental
program aimed at testing these theories. The experimental literature is vast, so we
cannot summarize every paper here. Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000) review the
older literature, and we refer the interested reader to those surveys.
In a recent meta-analysis, Blavatskyy et al. (2015) analyze results from 39 com-
mon consequence Allais Paradox experiments, which is one specific pattern of inde-
pendence axiom violations. In the original formulation of the common consequence
effect, we ask a decision maker to choose in the following binary decisions:
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Option A: Option B:
Q1: 100% chance of $100 million vs. 10% chance of $500 million
89% chance of $100 million
1% chance of $0
Q2: 11% chance of $100 million vs. 10% chance of $500 million
89% chance of $0 90% chance of $0
Many decision makers choose Option A in Q1 and Option B in Q2, which constitutes
a violation of independence. Blavatskyy et al. (2015) analyze results from a number
of such questions that vary on many dimensions including size of lottery stakes, real
vs. hypothetical prizes, mixing probabilities, etc. Most papers ask only a single pair
of questions involving certainty.
Blavatskyy et al. look to see whether violations are more consistent with the cer-
tainty effect or the reverse certainty effect.4 In 22 out of 39 instances, the certainty
effect is more common. In six instances, the reverse certainty effect is more common
(Conlisk, 1989; Starmer, 1992; Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004; Blavatskyy, 2013).
There is no statistically significant difference between the two types of violations in
the remaining 11 instances.
As Blavatskyy et al. (2015) discuss, the Allais Paradox, therefore, seems less preva-
lent than one might expect given its prominence in the literature. Since the papers
reviewed in the meta-analysis vary on many dimensions, there is no systematic way
to compare the evidence. While there has been sparse evidence of the reverse cer-
tainty effect (in only five incentivized questions), no paper has looked at the whole
simplex in a structured way. The main contribution of our paper is to ask subjects a
large number of questions across the simplex involving certainty, or near certainty,
to study where violations of independence emerge.
The prominence of the certainty effect in certain strands of the literature has led to
theoretical work attempting to capture the empirical evidence. These alternatives to
EUT typically weaken the independence axiom to accommodate the Allais Paradox.
Some of the popular alternative theories are disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991),
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), rank dependent utility
theory (Quiggin, 1982), weighted expected utility theory (Hong and Waller, 1986),
implicit expected utility theory (Dekel, 1986), and cautious expected utility theory
4In their Table 1, the certainty effect is labeled “SR” and the reverse certainty effect is labeled
“RS.”
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(Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015).5
Each non-EU theory listed above can accommodate the certainty effect, but we
highlight here Cautious Expected Utility (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015) because it was
designed exactly to characterize certainty-effect preferences. Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
weaken independence by requiring it to hold only when risk is already preferred to
certainty, allowing for independence violations when certainty is preferred to risk.
Formally, they replace independence with an axiom, Negative Certainty Indepen-
dence (NCI), first introduced in Dillenberger (2010). NCI states that for all lotteries
p, q ∈∆(X ), prizes x ∈ X , degenerate lotteries δx, and probabilities λ ∈ [0,1],
p º δx ⇒λp+ (1−λ)q ºλδx + (1−λ)q.
This requires that independence holds when a lottery, p, is preferred to $x for sure,
but does not require independence to hold in the opposite case where certainty is pre-
ferred to risk. As such, this theory exactly characterizes the preference for certainty
underlying the Allais paradox and other commonly-observed patterns of behavior.
However, the authors point out that “no comprehensive tests of NCI have been
conducted thus far” (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015), p. 713). We see our paper as a nat-
ural step in this dialogue between theory and experiments. Our results suggest that
the certainty effect is not always the main obstacle for the independence axiom—in
our data, the reverse certainty effect is the main obstacle for independence, empha-
sizing the importance of a systematic test of independence to inform behaviorally-
descriptive theories. Indeed, in a more recent paper, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2020)
characterize preferences with the opposite axiom, Positive Certainty Independence
(PCI), which requires independence hold instead when a sure payment is preferred
to a risky lottery.
Finally, a few recent papers in various domains suggest that the certainty effect
requires true certainty (probability one), and differs predictably from “near certainty”
(Halevy, 2008; Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2010; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010, 2011,
2012). We include tests of independence involving true certainty as well as tests
near certainty. This allows us to see whether the patterns we find are robust to this
perturbation, and allows us to test whether independence is violated more often in
5While many of these theories can accommodate the reverse certainty effect in the “opposite” way,
they were designed to capture the certainty effect.
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questions that offer certainty. Our main results hold both under certainty and near-
certainty.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We describe the theoretical framework in the context of our experimental design. All
questions involve lotteries over US dollars. The set of possible prizes in our experi-
ment is X = {10,20,30}. We represent the set of lotteries with prizes in X by ∆(X ),
with weak preferences º defined over ∆(X ). We denote generic prizes in X by x, y, z,
and denote generic lotteries in ∆(X ) by p, q, r, s. The probability of receiving prize x
under lottery p is denoted p(x). We represent the three-outcome lottery, p, giving $10
with probability p(10), $20 with probability p(20), and $30 with probability p(30) by
($30, p(30);$20, p(20);$10, p(10)). We represent the degenerate lottery giving $x for
sure as δx.
The independence axiom states that for all p, q, r ∈∆(X ) and for all λ ∈ [0,1],
p º q ⇔λp+ (1−λ)r ºλq+ (1−λ)r.
We consider only “one-stage” lottery mixtures, rather than two-stage compound lot-
teries.6 In our experiment, we will test the independence axiom by presenting sub-
jects with binary choices over these one-stage lotteries.
There are two ways individuals can violate independence when one option is cer-
tain. The certainty effect (CE) captures the idea that individuals place disproportion-
ate weight on an outcome when it is certain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Individ-
uals with a strong preference for certainty will be more likely to violate independence
when certainty is preferred to a risky lottery before mixing. The intuition is that the
preference of δx over p may be driven, in part, by the certainty appeal of receiving $x
for sure. When these lotteries are mixed as in independence, λδx + (1−λ)r does not
carry the same certainty appeal, which might result in a preference for λp+ (1−λ)r
over λδx + (1−λ)r. When individuals violate independence in this way, we call it a
“CE” violation.
The reverse certainty effect (RCE) is the exact opposite pattern. This refers to an
individual who chooses p over δx and then chooses λδx + (1−λ)r over λp+ (1−λ)r.
6In other words, we study mixture independence, rather than compound independence, as defined
in Segal (1990).
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We refer to this as an “RCE” violation. Our main research question is documenting
the prevalence of independence violations and comparing the frequency of these two
patterns of violations in a systematic way.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Figure I: Questions
We chose three payments—$10, $20, and $30—and all questions involve lotteries
over these three payments.7 In order to compare CE and RCE violations, we needed
7There is evidence that independence violations under certainty are more prevalent with large
stakes than small stakes, reviewed in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). Therefore, we wanted to pick
payments that were fairly high. Our payments averaged to around $20 per person, and sessions took
only 30 minutes. Subjects knew this ahead of time. We felt this $40/hr average payment would be
reasonably high stakes based on the literature.
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to ask questions where a risky lottery is likely to be preferred to certainty, as well
as questions where certainty is likely to be preferred to the risky lottery. To ensure
this, we selected 45 points uniformly across the simplex. These 45 questions are
denoted with circles in the top left graph of Figure I, and we refer to these as the
“unmixed lotteries.” We asked binary questions comparing these lotteries against a
sure payment of $20: a choice of p vs. δ20.
To test independence, we mixed these lotteries with r = ($10,1). We used three
different mixing probabilities, λ = {0.25,0.50,0.75}. This results in 45 new binary
choices for each value of λ: λp vs. λδ20. The lotteries after mixing are shown in the
remaining three panels of Figure I.8
We test the robustness of the certainty effect by moving δ20 slightly away from
certainty, comparing these unmixed lotteries against ($30,0.05;$20,0.90;$10,0.05),
denoted by a diamond in Figure I. This lottery is “close” to a sure payment of $20,
but does not offer the same security. For simplicity, we’ll call this lottery q∗, and
we’ll refer to these questions as “near-certain.” Subjects face both certain and near-
certain questions, as we explain below. When talking about alternatives in these
binary comparisons, we refer to p and λp as the “risky lotteries” and refer to either
δ20 and λδ20, or q∗ and λq∗, as the “safer lotteries.” We reserve “certainty” only for
δ20.
In total, we have 360 possible questions–the 45 unmixed lotteries compared with
$20 in the certain condition (45 questions) and compared with q∗ in the near-certain
condition (45 questions). These 90 questions comprise the “unmixed” comparisons,
and each is mixed by λ= 0.75,0.50,0.25 (90×4= 360). Since it might be unreasonable
for individuals to answer all 360 questions, each subject instead answered 68 binary
questions from the set of 360 possible questions.9 To perform the random selection,
we created a bank of 90 questions—the 45 unmixed lotteries compared against $20
and the same 45 unmixed lotteries compared against q∗. We randomly and inde-
pendently selected 17 of these 90 questions for each subject. For those 17 questions,
we asked subjects the unmixed question and all three λ= {0.25,0.50,0.75} mixtures.
This gives a total of 17×4= 68 binary choices per subject.
This random selection process helps ensure that, on average for each subject, we
8Though we sometimes refer to lotteries “before” or “after” mixing for ease of exposition, there is
no temporal component to the experiment. As we explain, questions were presented to subjects in
random order.
968 was calibrated based on duration of the experiment.
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will have observations where the risky lottery is preferred to the safer lottery and
vice versa, and we will also have observations for both certain and near-certain com-
parisons. It also allows us to test independence more rigorously than in single binary
choices, as independence requires an individual to choose either the risky or safer op-
tion in all four λ comparisons. This design also rules out the possibility that indepen-
dence violations result from indifference, which is a common critique of experiments
that observe preference reversals (Blavatskyy, 2010). Given the number and diver-
sity of questions we ask, systematic and persistent violations of independence cannot
be explained through indifference.10
Finally, we conducted two between-subject treatments. The first, which we have
explained above, mixes lotteries with the bottom right of the simplex, r = ($10,1).
This is closest in spirit to the original Allais Paradox where the lotteries were mixed
with the lowest possible payoff. We refer to this as the “Allais Mix” treatment. To
further test the robustness of independence violations, we ran a separate treatment
that mixes lotteries instead with the midpoint of the simplex, r = (30, 13 ;20, 13 ;10, 13 ),
which we refer to as the “Middle Mix” treatment. Each subject participated in either
the Allais Mix or Middle Mix treatment, but not both. We defer explanation of the
Middle Mix treatment to Section V.
Procedures
We present results from 14 experimental sessions with a total of 265 subjects, 118 in
the Allais Mix treatment and 147 in the Middle Mix treatment. Subjects were mainly
undergraduates from Ohio State University, recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted
approximately 30 minutes and subject payments averaged $20.
The experimenter read instructions out loud to all subjects. Instructions explained
the binary choices and how the probabilities would translate into payoffs. Computer
screens displayed the written probabilities and payoffs, as well as color-coded pie
charts. Figure VIII in the Appendix shows a screenshot. All 68 questions were
displayed in random order, randomized separately across subjects. In particular,
it was not necessarily the case that subjects first saw the unmixed question, then the
λ= 0.75,0.5,0.25 questions, and subjects were unaware that questions were related
10Given the structure of our lotteries, subjects could be exactly indifferent to $20 on one “ray” from
the origin, which is at most 5 questions.
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in any way. Furthermore, each question was displayed on a separate screen, and we
randomized the left-right screen position of the risky and safer lottery.
Subjects were paid after everyone in the session completed the experiment. We
used physical randomization devices to determine payments, and subjects knew this
ahead of time. The experimenter rolled two 10-sided dice at the front of the room
to generate a number 1–68.11 This determined the random question that would be
paid. Then, the experimenter rolled the dice again to generate a number 1–100 to
resolve any risk in the randomly selected lottery. Subjects were paid the realization
from whichever lottery they had chosen in the randomly-selected decision. Therefore,
subjects were paid based on exactly one decision they made in the entire experiment.
This payment method, denoted the “random payment selection” (RPS) mechanism,
has been used in many binary choice experiments. As discussed in Azrieli et al.
(2019), by using the RPS mechanism, we are assuming that compound independence
holds (Segal, 1990).12 Brown and Healy (2018) give evidence that compound inde-
pendence holds when presenting choices on separate screens, as we do in our exper-
iment. Segal (1990) shows that compound independence and reduction of compound
lotteries together imply mixture independence, which is the form of independence we
study. Therefore, by using this payment mechanism, we assume that individuals
do not always satisfy reduction of compound lotteries, since we observe violations of
mixture independence.
V. RESULTS
We focus our main results on the certain comparisons in the Allais Mix treatment.
These are questions where subjects chose between a risky lottery and $20 for sure
in the unmixed question, and separately made the same binary comparison when
both were mixed with 100% chance of $10, for three different mixing probabilities
λ= {0.75,0.50,0.25}. Across all of these binary comparisons, individuals violate inde-
pendence 25% of the time.13
11If the number came up larger than 68, she rolled again.
12Let A and B be two-stage lotteries over the simple lotteries in our experiment. That is,
A=(αp, p;αq, q; ...;αr, r; ...;αs, s) is a two-stage lottery that gives simple lottery p with probability αp,
lottery q with probability αq, etc. Let B=(αp, p;αq, q; ...;αr, t; ...;αs, s), meaning that lottery B differs
from lottery A only in that B gives lottery r with probability αr while A gives lottery t with that same
probability. Compound independence says that A is preferred to B if and only if r is preferred to t.
13This percentage likely would change as we change payoffs, unmixed lotteries, etc. Therefore, we
do not emphasize the raw percentage of violations, and leave it to the reader to decide whether this is
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(1) λ= 0.75 (2) λ= 0.50
(3) λ= 0.25
Figure II: Independence Violations in the Simplex
Notes: Figures show percentage of independence violations in the Allais Mix questions, compared
with δ20. Size of bubbles denote frequency of violations, with percentages as indicated in the legend.
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Figure II shows the violations of independence in the simplex, separated by mixing
probability. We find higher violations of independence as λ decreases.14 We find indi-
viduals violate independence in 22% of decisions when λ= 0.75, 26% when λ= 0.50,
and 27% when λ= 0.25 (Wilcoxon ranksum p-values, 0.75 vs. 0.25 p = 0.007, 0.75 vs.
0.50 p = 0.074, 0.50 vs. 0.25 p = 0.361). We also see that violations appear more com-
mon for risky lotteries with higher expected value (lotteries to the northwest). These
are lotteries where individuals are more likely to have chosen the risky option in
the unmixed question. We formalize this conjecture below, showing that individuals
indeed violate independence more when the risky lottery is preferred to certainty.
Certainty Effect vs. Reverse Certainty Effect
We denote a violation of independence as a “reverse certainty effect” (RCE) violation
when individuals prefer the risky lottery to δ20 in the unmixed question but reverse
their preference in the mixed question. We refer to the opposite as a “certainty effect”
(CE) violation, when individuals prefer δ20 to the risky lottery in the unmixed ques-
tion but reverse their preference in the mixed question. Table I presents our main
results. In the second column, we compare the aggregate percentages of CE and
RCE violations. Contrary to popular belief, we find that RCE violations are twice as
common as CE violations (66% vs. 33%, Fisher-Pitman permutation test p < 0.001).
% of Independence % Violating
Violations Independence
Chose Risky in Unmixed (n=419) 66% 39%
Chose Safe in Unmixed (n=578) 33% 15%
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001
Table I: Percentage of Independence Violations Conditional on Choice in Unmixed
Question
Note: Results are separated by choice in the unmixed question. p º δ20 indicates instances where
individuals chose risk over certainty, while p ¹ δ20 indicates the opposite.
The last column of Table I looks at the likelihood of violating independence con-
ditional on an individual’s choice in the unmixed question. Here, we find the com-
plementary result. Individuals violate independence in 39% of binary comparisons
a large number or not.
14This could be because the lotteries converge as λ decreases, so they become closer to one another
in expected value. Alternatively, it could be because they are least similar to the original lotteries.
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where they chose the risky option in the unmixed question. On the contrary, they
violate independence in only 15% of binary comparisons where they chose δ20 in the
unmixed question. Therefore, we find that individuals are significantly more likely to
violate independence in questions where they prefer risk to certainty, rather than the
opposite (Fisher-Pitman permutation test, p < 0.001). In the Appendix, we show that
this result is not driven by having more questions where individuals prefer the safe
alternative. Results hold to the same extent when we look at a sub-sample balanced
across risky-safe choices.
Our main result is surprising in light of a large literature on the certainty ef-
fect. We find that independence violations are much more common when individuals
prefer risk to certainty in the absence of mixing. This is exactly the opposite of Al-
lais’s intuition, which hypothesized that independence violations would be driven by
a “preference for security.” Instead, two-thirds of our violations result when a risky
lottery is preferred to certainty.
The Role of Certainty
The original intuition of the certainty effect claimed that “certainty” held a funda-
mentally different appeal from “near certainty.” We test this by analyzing differ-
ences in independence violations when comparisons involve true certainty (δ20) ver-
sus near-certain (q∗ = ($30,0.05;$20,0.90;$10,0.05)) options. We find the overall per-
centage of independence violations is slightly but significantly higher under certainty
(25% vs. 22%, Fisher-Pitman Permutation Test, p = .00415).
Percentage of Independence Violations
Near-Certain Certain
Chose Risky in Unmixed 36% 39%
Chose Safer in Unmixed 11% 15%
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001
Table II: Percentage of Independence Violations Conditional on Choice in Unmixed
Question, by Near-Certain and Certain
Note: Results are separated by choice in the unmixed question.
Nevertheless, Table II shows that our main result holds equally under certainty
as near certainty: Individuals are nearly three times more likely to violate indepen-
dence in questions where risk is preferred to certainty or near-certainty.
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Dependent Variable: Violation of Independence
Unmixed Risky 0.858***
(0.0997)
Certain 0.174**
(0.0787)
Unmixed Risky × Certain -0.0801
(0.112)
No. Observations 6,018
No. Clusters 118
Table III: Probit regression predicting violations of Independence
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 for a violation of independence, 0
otherwise. Unmixed Risky is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the individual chose the risky lottery
in the unmixed question, 0 otherwise. The Certain dummy takes the value of 1 when the unmixed
question compared against δ20, 0 for questions compared against q∗. We cluster standard errors at
the subject level.
Table III confirms these results in a probit regression. The dependent variable
is a dummy taking the value of 1 for a violation of independence, 0 otherwise. In-
dependent variables include an Unmixed Risky dummy, taking the value of 1 if the
individual chose the risky lottery in the unmixed question, 0 otherwise. We include a
Certain dummy taking the value of 1 when the unmixed question compared against
δ20, 0 for questions compared against q∗. We also include the interaction between
these two variables. We cluster standard errors at the subject level.
The results from the regression confirm the conclusions above. Violations of inde-
pendence are significantly more common when individuals choose the riskier option
in the unmixed question. Overall violations are slightly more common under cer-
tainty. Regardless, RCE violations prevail.
Individual-Level Results
Our main result holds on an individual level, as well. Figure III shows the percentage
of independence violations per subject, broken down by CE and RCE types. That is,
for each individual, we separate the 17 unmixed questions they answered according
to whether they preferred the risky or safer lottery. Then, we compute the average
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independence violations, for each individual, within these two sets. We see that the
modal subject never violates independence in questions where they preferred the
safer lottery to the risky lottery. When they preferred the risky lottery, however, the
modal subject violates independence one-third of the time.
Figure III: Individual-Level Violations by Unmixed Risky vs. Unmixed Safe
Notes: Histogram shows the percentage of questions in which each individual violates the
independence axiom, separated out by CE violations (where the individual preferred δ20 to the risky
lottery) and RCE violations (where they preferred the risky lottery to δ20).
Furthermore, for each subject, we take the difference between their likelihood of
RCE and CE violations (RCE - CE). For example, a subject who violated indepen-
dence in 25% of questions where they preferred the risky lottery over δ20 and vi-
olated independence in 15% of questions where they preferred δ20 over the risky
lottery would give a difference of 0.10. Figure IV shows the results. A large majority
of subjects (81%) demonstrate a positive difference in violations, meaning that a ma-
jority of our subjects express more RCE than CE violations. Therefore, we conclude
that RCE violations are more common both in aggregate and on an individual-level.
In the Appendix, we also show that the prevalence of RCE violations is not driven
by individual risk preferences. We use a jackknife procedure to calculate the percent-
age of independence violations for subjects who chose the risky versus safer lottery
in each question, repeated for all questions in the simplex. We find no average differ-
ences across these sub-samples.
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Figure IV: Individual-Level Difference Between Percentage of RCE and CE Viola-
tions
Notes: Histogram shows individual-level difference in the percentage of questions in which the
individual violates the independence axiom in preferring the risky lottery over δ20 minus the
percentage of questions in which the individual violates the independence axiom in preferring δ20
over the risky lottery.
A More Rigorous Test
Given that each individual answers four questions all linked by independence—λ =
{1,0.75,0.50,0.75}—we can analyze violations of independence using all four choices
as a unit of observation. We define an individual’s four choices by a string of four
letters, each R (riskier) or S (safer). The first letter represents their choice in the
unmixed question (λ= 1), the second in the λ= 0.75 mixed question, the third in the
λ= 0.50 question, and the last in the λ= 0.25 question. Thus, the string represents
choices as we move towards the bottom right of the simplex.
Independence requires the individual choose either R or S in all four questions.
This is a more stringent requirement than in our main analysis, as it requires in-
dividuals to be consistent in all three binary comparisons. Nevertheless, these are
the two most common patterns we see, first SSSS followed by RRRR. About 60% of
our data falls into one of those two patterns.15 Consistent with the analysis above,
15Recall that just looking at binary comparisons, about 75% of choices were consistent with inde-
pendence.
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Pattern Near-Certain Certain
SSSS 449 425
RRRR 191 159
RSSS 71 72
RRRS 41 36
RRSS 38 45
RRSR 32 38
SSSR 29 43
RSRR 24 24
RSRS 22 19
SSRS 22 18
RSSR 21 26
SRRR 18 29
SRSS 18 19
SSRR 15 12
SRSR 12 17
SRRS 6 15
Table IV: Pattern of Choices Per Question
however, the next most common patterns involve choosing the riskier option in the
unmixed question and choosing the safer alternative as λ decreases. In the most
common independence violation, RSSS, individuals choose the riskier option only in
the unmixed question but then choose the safer option in all mixtures. In the second
most common violation, RRSS, individuals choose the riskier option in the unmixed
question and λ= 0.75, but choose the safer option in the λ= 0.50,0.25 mixtures. All
patterns can be found in Table IV. We find no significant difference across certain
and uncertain questions (Chi-square p = 0.351).
Analyzing the data from all four questions also allows us to test whether viola-
tions of independence are less common in the interior of the simplex. Allais hy-
pothesized that “ ‘far from certainty,’ individuals act as expected utility maximizers”
(Allais, 1953, translated by Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). If this were the case, we
would only see independence violations of the SRRR and RSSS types, where individ-
uals act consistently with independence in the λ= 0.75,0.50,0.25 mixtures but might
violate it near certainty. Instead, we find that these patterns make up only 24% of
independence violations in the certain comparisons in our sample. Over three quar-
ters of choice patterns violating independence involve violations in questions that lie
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strictly on the interior of the simplex.16
Furthermore, the SRRR pattern most closely associated with the certainty effect
is very rare. These are instances in which individuals choose the safe option when it
is certain or near-certain, but then reverse their preferences when both alternatives
move away from certainty. Conditional on choosing S in the λ= 1 question, only 17%
of violations follow this pattern.
Robustness to the Mixing Lottery
16All near-certain violations are also strictly interior.
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Figure V: Questions in the Middle Mixture Treatment
We test the robustness of our results to the choice of r, the mixing lottery in the
definition of the independence axiom: p º q ⇔ λp+ (1−λ)r º λq+ (1−λ)r. In our
main treatment, we chose r to be ($10, 1), or 100% chance of the lowest payoff. This
is closest in spirit to the original Allais paradox, where the lotteries were mixed with
a large chance of receiving $0. In our robustness sessions, we conducted exactly
the same experiment, except we mixed all lotteries instead with the midpoint of the
simplex, ($30, 13 ;$20,
1
3 ;$10,
1
3 ). We chose this point so that mixing would converge to
a different area of the simplex, one which has not been studied in detail based on our
review of the literature. Other than the choice of r, all procedures in these sessions
followed identically to those in the main session.
Overall, individuals violate independence in 23% of questions, which is slightly
but significantly higher than in our original treatment (23% vs. 20%, Chi-square
p < 0.001). Figures XI and XII in the Appendix show the distribution of violations
across the simplex.
Under certainty, again we see RCE violations are more common than CE viola-
tions. Figure VI shows that two thirds of violations under certainty are driven by
individuals who choose the riskier option in the unmixed question (p < 0.001). On
the other hand, violations near certainty are driven equally by those choosing the
riskier and safer option in the unmixed question (permutation test p = 0.146). While
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our main treatment did not show any significant differences between certainty and
near-certainty, our robustness treatment suggests that certainty does have an impact
outside the Allais paradigm.
Figure VI: Percentage of RCE/Safe Choices Among Violations
Notes: “Unmixed Risky” refers to questions in which the individual chose the risky lottery over the
safer lottery in the unmixed question. “Unmixed Safe” refers to the opposite. “Near Certain” are
comparisons with q∗ = ($30,0.05;$20,0.90;$10,0.05) while “Certain” are comparisons with δ20.
Figure VII: Percentage of Violations by RCE/Safe
Notes: “Unmixed Risky” refers to questions in which the individual chose the risky lottery over the
safer lottery in the unmixed question. “Unmixed Safe” refers to the opposite. “Near Certain” are
comparisons with q∗ = ($30,0.05;$20,0.90;$10,0.05) while “Certain” are comparisons with δ20.
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Figure VII confirms this further. In the case of certainty, individuals who choose
the risky option in the unmixed question are much more likely to violate indepen-
dence than those who choose the safe option. Near certainty, however, this difference
is much smaller (p < 0.001 for both). Therefore, it seems that the choice of the mixing
lottery contributes to the effect of certainty.
Its important to note, however, that while certainty does play a role, it is in the di-
rection exactly opposite the consensus in the literature. The literature would suggest
that certainty plays a role in inducing violations where certainty is preferred to risk
in the absence of mixing. Our results suggest the opposite effect is much stronger:
Violations of independence are most common when risk is preferred to certainty.
VI. DISCUSSION
We study the independence axiom and how violations of independence interact with
a preference for certainty. Contrary to a prominent thread in the literature, we find
that violations of independence in our data are not predominantly driven by this pref-
erence for certainty. Instead, violations are more common when individuals prefer
risk to certainty. We find this is also true when we move slightly away from certainty.
Our results are surprising in light of the large literature following up on the orig-
inal Allais Paradox counter-examples to independence. The certainty effect is well-
documented and is one of the primary pieces of evidence motivating new theoretical
models. Our paper aims to provide a more structured analysis to document violations
of the independence axiom near certainty. Our results suggest caution in attributing
violations of independence to the certainty effect primarily, but more evidence is re-
quired before making general statements on where and when to expect violations of
expected utility.
We document consistent patterns of behavior, but leave open the question of what
drives these preferences. In particular, correlation of independence violations with
measures such as IQ, cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores, etc. remain an interest-
ing open question for future research. We also leave open the questions of how these
patterns of violations change with payment amounts and other parameters of the
decision environment.
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A. ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Figure VIII: Screenshot of subjects’ display during the experiment
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Risk Preferences
In this section, we look to see whether our main results are driven by individual risk
preferences. Our main result could emerge from one of two behavioral phenomenon.
It could be the case that any individual, when choosing a risky lottery over a sure
amount, is more likely to violate independence than when choosing the sure amount
over the risky lottery. On the other hand, it could be that more risk-seeking indi-
viduals, who are more likely to choose the risky lottery over the sure amount, are
more likely to violate independence. We rule out the latter explanation using the
following non-parametric procedure. For each of the original 45 questions of p vs.
$20, we split the sample into those who chose the risky lottery and those who chose
the sure amount. Then, we look at average independence violations in all other ques-
tions for these two types of individuals. If independence violations are driven by risk
preferences, we should see more violations for risky types than for safe types. Figure
IX shows the histogram of violations. A Wilcoxon sign-rank test shows no signifi-
cant differences in these distributions (p = 0.569). Therefore, it is not the case that
our pattern of violations is driven by individual heterogeneity in risk preferences.
Instead, it seems to be the case that individuals will be more likely to violate the
independence axiom in any question where they prefer a risky lottery over a sure
amount.
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Figure IX: Histogram of Independence Violations by Risk Preferences
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Figure X: Distribution of Risky Choices in the Unmixed Questions
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(1) λ= 0.75 (2) λ= 0.50
(3) λ= 0.25
Figure XI: Independence Violations in the Simplex
Notes: Figures show percentage of independence violations in the Middle mix questions, compared
with certainty. Size of bubbles denote frequency of violations.
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(1) λ= 0.75 (2) λ= 0.50
(3) λ= 0.25
Figure XII: Independence Violations in the Simplex
Notes: Figures show percentage of independence violations in the Middle mix questions, compared
with q∗. Size of bubbles denote frequency of violations.
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Sample Balance
One might worry that these results are driven “mechanically” by risk preferences. If
there are more points where individuals prefer the safer option in the unmixed ques-
tion, then it might be less likely for violations to come from these points simply as a
statistical artifact. We chose our simplex to be “balanced” in a natural way, but we
need to ensure it is “behaviorally balanced” in order to make the claim that one type
of violation is more common than another. First, we note that individuals chose the
safer alternative in 57% of the unmixed questions. This is significantly larger than
the 43% of risky choices (Fisher-Pitman p < 0.001). This could bias our results, since
it suggests that there are more questions where the safe thing is “obviously” pre-
ferred than there are questions where the risky thing is “obviously” preferred. These
might be questions where we would expect the fewest violations of independence. We
correct for this by identifying these lotteries and dropping them from the analysis.
In particular, recall that the lotteries in our design lie on nine different rays orig-
inating from the origin in Figure I. We calculate the percentage of subjects (92%)
choosing the riskier alternative for unmixed questions lying on the steepest ray.
Then, we drop rays where the percentage of subjects choosing the safer alternative
for unmixed questions lies at or above 92%.17 In this remaining subset of questions,
there should be no more questions where the safe thing is “obviously” preferred than
there are questions where the risky thing is “obviously” preferred. In other words,
we ensure the simplex is “behaviorally balanced” to account for subjects’ risk pref-
erences. On this subset, 55% of subjects choose the riskier option in the unmixed
question, now slightly unbalanced in the opposite direction. Therefore, if we find
that RCE violations still prevail, we can be confident that the result is not driven by
an unbiased sample.
On this restricted sample, we see the same results hold. Overall, we find that 73%
of violations near certainty and 66% of violations with certainty come from individu-
als who chose the risky option in the unmixed question. As Figure XIII demonstrates,
individuals are significantly more likely to violate independence in situations where
they chose risk over certainty (near certainty).
17In doing so, we drop the two flattest rays.
32
Figure XIII: Percentage of Violations by Choice in the Unmixed Question on our
Behaviorally Balanced Sample
33
